Abstract-Systems engineering projects that support government enterprises face substantial challenges due to demands from diverse stakeholders and rapidly changing technologies. In this paper, we present findings from the analysis of five case studies of systems engineering projects for large government enterprises. We focus on what can be learned from systems engineers, their essential role, and their engineering practices. As they work to establish interoperability across preexisting and new technologies, thereby evolving an infrastructure, the engineers commonly face "agonistic" tensions between groups of stakeholders. Temporal pacing conflicts are especially prevalent, such as those between some stakeholder groups concerned with fast-paced streams of innovation and others concerned with current operations. In response, many engineers are following an evolutionary approach, developing new capabilities for incremental modularization and re/integration of technologies and associated practices across organizational (stakeholder) boundaries. Additionally, engineers are leveraging their professional role and developing new skills of influence to support these capabilities for addressing stakeholder tensions. We close by discussing implications of our findings for the management of infrastructure technology projects, for organizational design and engineering of government enterprises, and for the changing role of systems engineers.
tems engineering, these enterprise systems engineering projects confront multiple information and communication systems and technologies-many already in operational use-that must somehow be linked into a coherent infrastructure [16] , [17] for diverse and competing stakeholder communities. For example, the military services (Army, Navy, Air Force, etc.) are now being mandated to use interoperable communications and information technologies in an ongoing transition toward "net-centric operations;" similar pressures exist for national agencies including Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, and the Federal Aviation Administration. Further, in contrast to for-profit enterprises, government enterprises often lack both an overall hierarchical management chain and a bottom-line mechanism for evaluating success-a combination that renders their systems engineering projects all the more challenging.
This paper reports results from a research study on social and organizational aspects of large-scale systems engineering projects in five government enterprises. These case studies revealed that systems engineers are adapting both their capabilities for managing projects and their individual professional skill sets to meet the challenges inherent in this shift from systems to infrastructure. Our evidence suggests new implications for the management of infrastructure technology projects, for the organizational design and engineering of government enterprises, and for the changing role of systems engineers.
II. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING
Systems engineering began as a sub-discipline of engineering after World War II when the development of weapons systems, aerospace systems, and other commercial applications was expanding beyond the capabilities of independent engineering disciplines [23] , [33] , [36] , [56] . By offering the label of "system," the focus was placed on the entire technical system being engineered, such as a missile or airplane, rather than on the component pieces that were the responsibility of discipline-based subteams and subcontractors. Ferris [23] notes that a significant portion of the systems engineering approach was an emphasis on the planning and control of technical work.
Although systems engineering is still a relatively young and evolving field [63] , its major activities have already coalesced around systems analysis, acquisition and supply, project management, system design (requirements and specifications) and integration, implementation or transition to use, and technical evaluation [36, p. 36] , [42] . These traditional systems engineering methods for achieving interoperability and avoiding redundancies are predicated on long-development cycles and emphasize formally structured requirements, specifications, and integration testing at the end of the project.
The concept of "system-of-systems engineering" (SoSE) [21] , [37] emerged in the late 1980s to address a recognized need for an engineering approach that focused on the integration of multiple, complex systems [28] . 1 Building on the systems engineering efforts for individual systems, SoSE emphasizes the "interaction" and "synergy" between independent systems toward overall system performance [35] . Yet, despite a number of efforts to codify the principles and practices of the discipline, SoSE has neither a coherent, widely accepted definition [54] nor agreement on whether the concept is even needed (cf. [11] ).
Traditional systems engineering approaches and even SoSE approaches are still not sufficient to address some types of problems for large government enterprises [38] , [49] . Hughes [33, p. 304 ] noted that systems engineering was continuing to evolve as more large-scale systems are developed in military and civilian applications, and is increasingly "a messily complex embracing of contradictions" with the projects being "socially constructed, not technologically and economically determined" (see also [63] ). Further, Rouse [53] suggests that the emphasis for systems development has recently shifted from platforms to capabilities.
An emerging concept has come to be known as enterprise systems engineering (ESE). Rhodes et al. [50] observe that the enterprise systems concept is "well accepted," yet the research literature remains limited and "insufficient for many contemporary enterprises that are (or are evolving into) large-scale, global systems integrators or solution providers" (p. 2). Enterprise systems often span multiple organizations, require a higher degree of integration, and must support varied and complex interactions among processes, technology, and people, without recourse to a hierarchical control authority [12] . However, in large enterprises with different systems and technologies evolving at different rates, component technologies must now be (continuously) integrated across different lifecycle stages so that traditional systems engineering approaches predicated on large sets of formally structured requirements and long-development cycles are no longer practical.
In this paper, we present the results of an exploratory study of five large government-contracted enterprise systems engineering projects that vary in size, duration, complexity, and success. Our study examines the engineering challenges and the engineers' adaptive responses with the intent of capturing emerging enterprise systems engineering knowledge and approaches that can be useful for understanding and improving the management of such engineering projects. Our primary research question was to understand and describe "enterprise systems engineering"-how it was different from traditional systems engineering. A secondary question was how experienced systems engineers were addressing these differences in their work.
III. METHODS
Because theory on our research questions was nascent and there was little a priori specification of constructs, empirical field research was needed to develop theory, with special attention to issues of validity [63] . We used a qualitative research approach: comparative case studies for theory development [19] , [65] . Our research team included three senior engineer practitioners and several social scientists. 2 This diversity of researchers' backgrounds helped to limit bias [20, p. 28] during data collection and analysis, and ensured that we had adequate expertise to understand both technical and organizational contingencies relevant to systems engineering work.
A. Case Selection
We had access to cases contracted between government enterprises and The MITRE Corporation, a not-for-profit organization that administers several Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs) involved in the technical design of large information and communication systems for government enterprises. FFRDCs are not-for-profit organizations outside of the U.S. government that conduct research and/or do systems engineering work for federal government agencies; comparable organizations exist in other nations as well.
We selected cases according to theoretical sampling to support replication logic [19] , [65] . This enabled us to use each case as a separate field experiment in evaluating inferences drawn from the others. We selected five cases all of which were large in size (tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands of users) and that spanned a range of customer groups and levels of success. The cases also varied in length of project, maturity of technologies, and national setting. Case details are provided in Table I .
B. Data Collection
We gathered data using multiple methods-interviews, observation, and documentary materials-to enable triangulation and increase construct validity. Our primary source of data was interviews conducted by a team of researchers with different backgrounds, which also supported confidence in our conclusions. Interviews were typically held at the site where the engineering work was ongoing, which permitted observation. Researchers also obtained other background information, reviewing newspaper articles, web sites, and archived project materials, and attended a project conference for one of the cases.
To enable effective data collection on topics with highly technical content, the engineers on the research team assumed key roles in designing the interview protocol and conducting the interviews. The engineer researchers were first trained by the social scientists on appropriate methods for conducting objective and thorough interviews. With the close involvement of their social science colleagues, the engineer-practitioner researchers composed a series of questions for a semistructured interview protocol (see Appendix) designed to be similar to the types of conversations that engineers typically have with each other, in order to encourage candid sharing. Senior managers overseeing each project provided the names of project leads, who then identified qualified potential interviewees for each case study. All but two of the interviews were led by an engineer researcher, with at least two researchers with social science backgrounds taking notes and interjecting clarifying questions as necessary. Interviews lasted between 60 and 90 min. Social science researchers typed up their notes shortly after the interviews and the engineer researchers helped interpret acronyms and other engineering terminology.
Between three and six interviews were carried out for each case during the 2006-2007 timeframe; we refer to these as "Tier 1" interviews. Some additional ("Tier 2") interviews were conducted in 2008, using questions developed after the preliminary analysis of Tier 1 data. Altogether, a total of 30 interviews with 27 individuals were conducted across the five cases. 3 Additionally, one social science researcher sat in on three interviews with engineers from a second government agency in the Beta case, courtesy of an independent research project conducted by the Defense Acquisition University; this data was especially useful in balancing different perspectives across agencies in that case.
C. Analysis Process
We took precautions to counteract potential investigator bias during the analysis phase. The data collection and case-writing phases overlapped, during which time the team held weekly meetings to compare data, discuss cases, iteratively refine constructs and develop emerging themes, incorporating the views of both social science and engineer members of the research team. Each case was separately analyzed and written prior to the cross-case analysis. In addition to triangulating across multiple sources of data, multiple people with different backgrounds were involved in the writing and reviewing of each case study.
To ensure basic consistency of format across the case studies, the team created a common case outline. One or two authors then prepared a detailed case write up for each individual project, first reading through all transcribed notes from the interviews on that case, and then performing ad hoc coding to identify key themes particular to each case. Each case study was written as a detailed history, including a timeline of critical events, organizational charts, program accomplishments, challenges faced, engineering practices, lessons learned, and suggestions for further research. Each case was then iteratively reviewed and revisedfirst by other social science members of the team, then by a researcher engineer, then by the interviewees from the project, and finally by the corporate project manager. When engineers differed on their interpretations of case details, we discussed the matters and found ways to write the cases that they could then agree upon. Higher level managers had a broader view of the project contexts and were able to recommend additional interviews to fill in gaps in the data, as well as how to redact the data to eliminate unnecessary risks to the projects or to individuals. This combination of multiple reviews from different perspectives strengthened the validity of each individual case study. The team began preliminary cross-case analysis as individual case studies were being finalized. Tabular matrices [43] were developed to identify themes across the cases, which were then presented to interviewees for review during two workshops; these were also reviewed by senior managers. After all individual cases had been completed and accepted by interviewees and project managers, the principal investigator initiated the formal cross-case analysis, reviewing all of the original interview notes, the five case studies, and memos on the high-level themes, before completing a second round of coding across the entire five case dataset. These results were reviewed by social science team members, engineers, and managers. Relevant literature was iteratively compared with the emerging results to further refine our findings and was incorporated in the written products.
IV. FINDINGS

A. Challenges
Our data revealed that the engineers experienced major difficulties related to instability in the environment and systems requirements-instability which often prevented the traditional systems engineering processes from reaching completion. One Delta engineer described the challenge as "many moving parts, [which] constantly move." A Beta engineer reported that the complexity of the enterprise organization "broke a significant number of the traditional systems engineering practices that we depend on."
Much of the instability emerged from several distinct kinds of conflict or tension among stakeholders. Two of these categories of tension are consistent with those found in Edwards et al.'s [17] work on the development of computer infrastructures: interest and exclusion and ownership/investment models. However, our results extend their approach in two ways: first, our data suggest that there is a significant difference in the success of the project depending upon the organizational design of the enterprise (see Table II ); and second, we identified a new category of agonistic tensions-pacing of development (see Table III ). We elaborate on these tensions in the following, after a brief summary of the relevant work on infrastructure.
1) Infrastructure Evolution and Agonistic Tensions:
The historian of science and technology Paul Edwards and his associates draw a sharp distinction between technical systems and infrastructures in computer system development. They assert: "In general, . . . infrastructures are not systems. Instead, they are networks or webs that enable locally controlled and maintained systems to interoperate more or less seamlessly" [17, p. 12; emphasis in original]. According to this view, infrastructures develop through stages, beginning with the system building stage, in which "visionary" designers exercise considerable control. However, in the consolidation phase separate systems and/or networks are linked together-first in smaller area networks, and then, more globally. This is accomplished either by one system taking over, or more commonly through the use of gateways, which are "technologies and standards" that "allow dissimilar systems to be linked" [17, pp. i, 8, 10] .
One of the most notable characteristics of this infrastructure consolidation phase is the surfacing of political conflicts, or "agonistic" tensions: Drawing from work by Star and Ruhleder [59] on the importance of social practices relative to infrastructure development, Edwards et al. [17] stress that technological consolidation is generally easier to manage than are the attendant changes in relations between social and organizational units. This is because developing infrastructure entails redistributing resources and opportunities, therefore engaging a "deep politics of design" in which "people and groups fight over, around, and through the systems and networks that govern their lives" [18, p. 372 ]. 4 Our cases were replete with data for two of these types of tensions, which are described next, and are summarized in Table II. 2) Tensions Around Interest and Exclusion: Every infrastructure development effort has perceived winners and losers as the distribution of opportunities and influence change [17, p. 24] . These tensions were so common that one Delta engineer off-handedly referred to "food fights" over requirements. Such tensions also commonly surfaced in struggles around practicalities of designing technology gateways to bridge across different systems and networks, as experienced by the Gamma engineers: "Originally we were struggling with-'Can we develop in time and within budget?' Now we're trying to fill all the needs and that answer will be 'No.' "
3) Tensions Around Ownership/Investment: Similarly, the engineers were well aware that funding mechanisms, policy options, and other external constraints were significant sources of tension for their engineering projects. A Gamma engineer stated: "When outsiders dictate which [gateway technology], you lose control and there's higher risk." Tensions with external stakeholders also commonly surfaced around funding and budgetary arrangements: "Congressional districts are among the stakeholders-How do you deal with the congressional politics?" (Epsilon) "The . . . industry controls a large portion of . . . jobs in congressional districts." (Gamma) 4) Agonistic Tensions and Project Success/Failure: In looking across the five cases, we found that the projects that the engineers generally considered more successful exhibited less dis-ruption from interest/exclusion tensions. The Alpha and Delta projects were identified as relatively successful--they were also the only two cases out of the five in which member organizations had joined the government enterprise voluntarily. For example, an Alpha interviewee indicated: "Some people didn't want to be an Alpha node because they had other things to use their money for. . . Others were jumping on the bandwagon. . . 'We're Alpha all the way.' " Alpha and Delta projects were developed within well-established government enterprises which were relatively stable and had agree-upon governance mechanisms in place to enforce member compliance. In contrast, each of the other three projects labored under a government mandate to link together systems and technologies as a means to consolidate a new government enterprise comprised of organizational units that traditionally competed with each other for funding and political recognition. In these cases, project management seemed to try to satisfy everyone, ending up overcommitted and underresourced, with the result that the projects experienced more volatile and disruptive interest/exclusion tensions, and the mandate became recognized as infeasible. One interviewee reported that the Gamma effort "affected just about every program in the [service branch]-caused a lot of churn for systems that should never have had it . . . one of the most laughed at mandates. . .. It wasn't clear that you could do all that with software or get the crypto to work-we laughed and we cried." Additional data supporting these findings are summarized in Table II .
Some interviewees hypothesized that the mandates for such ambitious consolidation efforts were learning "experiments" intended to find where the limits were. Yet the fact that these failures were so enormously costly casts doubt upon such wisdom, and foreshadows our next result.
5) Tensions Around Pacing:
We were particularly struck by a consistent set of tensions around differences in stakeholders' orientations to the pace at which the evolutionary process of infrastructure development itself should proceed (see examples in Table III) . Clashes between organizations responsible for exploiting fast-paced streams of innovation and organizations concerned with slower-paced testing and operational fielding processes occurred in all of our cases (cf. [1] ). The former were long-range planning or R&D organizations (often bearing names that included "lab" or "experimentation" in their title). The latter were government organizations either directly engaged in current operations or responsible for the "acquisition" of technologies to meet the needs of users already working in the field (users dependent upon situated combinations of legacy and innovative technologies).
There is an inherent structural tension between these types of organizations. The expectations for improvisation and discontinuous change that are common within cultures of innovation contrast with the institutional arrangements for "acquisition," i.e., the contractual, legal, and regulatory arrangements for how new technological systems are to be funded, built, and fielded, which are rigorous and proceed cautiously in order to minimize risks (cf. [41] ). In our cases, senior officials concerned with "transformation" of military forces or "next generation" civil technologies advocated discontinuous change, whereas senior officials primarily concerned with ongoing operations and end users already out in the field displayed little tolerance for any change that was more than incremental. One Beta engineer described these interorganizational tensions explicitly:
there was conflict between the acquisition side, [ These pacing tensions were exacerbated by rapid leadership turnover. Large infrastructure technology projects, which take many years to complete, were usually initiated by individuals who occupied their positions for only two to three years before moving on to other jobs due to political appointments or military rotations. Thus there was rarely a single individual in charge of the entire project for long enough to effectively mediate differences among the stakeholders or dictate final decisions. One Gamma engineer described such a situation: In response, mid-and lower-level personnel in both the civil service and military commands, who were long-term (if not lifetime) employees, were tempted to simply wait for the leaderinitiated change efforts to "blow over" as the leaders left, a tactic referred to as "slow rolling." One Alpha interviewee made the point explicitly: "The culture is changing, but only because I think [the top two leaders] have stayed there long enough . . . . if people don't see the value, they will slow roll you." Pacing tensions manifested in many different ways as summarized in Table III , although "requirements creep" and "requirements churn" were especially ubiquitous throughout the cases.
B. Developing Capabilities: Changing Engineering Management Practices
Some of our interviewees indicated that they were responding to the challenges of the agonistic tensions in their projects by following an evolutionary approach. Denning et al. [14] posit that an evolutionary approach that involves "continual adaptation to the environment" through "successive releases" of new technology and/or survival of the fittest technology is necessary to reverse the increasing rate of failure in large system projects. Our findings show that these adaptive engineering management practices can be understood more specifically as capabilities of incremental modularization and reintegration across organizational boundaries. Systems engineers are modularizing large systems and networks into smallish "chunks," and then working to recombine them in different ways at later times. Data summarizing these findings are summarized in Table IV .
1) Modularizing Technologies:
To support separability and recombinability of components, engineers were developing capabilities for modularizing technologies. As an Alpha engineer explained, "For information systems, take on acquisitions that you can do within a year-completed within lifecyclelongevity of requirement. You basically evolve systems, pick off bite-size increments. Try things and take risks, and if it doesn't work, throw it out and start again." As the engineer noted, smaller chunks have shorter project timelines, which help avoid requirements creep and support adjustment to changing constraints and policies. Therefore, systems engineers are more willing to cancel or change projects and shorten completion times. For example, Delta projects were operating on "task order" contracts that supported multiple exit points where engineers could decide whether to renew the contract, thus allowing them to adapt to changes more readily.
Data revealed reliance on prototypes and the use of less expensive and readily available Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) products that also helped with shortening the time frame from requirements through development to fielding. "Prototyping is key . . . it is used to better capture user requirements and to validate as early as possible man-machine interface, etc." (Delta) Engineers pushed prototypes and/or COTS tools out into the field to circumvent the slow formal acquisition process, sometimes simply recategorizing them to move them into the hands of operational users in a timely fashion: "Many [user groups]. . .are pursuing alternative interim solutions . . . they use the term 'interim' to get it approved." (Gamma) Such smaller chunks of technology facilitated the reconciliation of interoperability constraints and eased the approval and acceptance process, in addition to facilitating the technology transfer phase that precedes consolidation during the infrastructure evolution process [17] .
2) Integrating Across Actors in Conflictual Field: Once technologies and programs had been modularized, a different set of challenges, also illustrated in Table IV, emerged as the TABLE IV  CAPABILITIES FOR MODULARIZATION AND INTEGRATION modules were integrated back into new arrangements. For example, the Alpha case involved consolidation of over 100 different types of databases into a small number of large database systems. Such technical challenges were perennially compounded by agonistic tensions and disagreements over how recombinations should be accomplished.
Our data indicated that engineers developed a range of capabilities to meet these challenges. One basic integration practice involved redrawing boundaries around collections of legacy and engineering programs to forge new program identities. For example, after having already been in existence for 4-5 years, the Delta project was being renamed to reflect a change of scope from an exclusive focus on military capabilities to one accommodating interoperability with other governmental elements: "Part of the strategy is naming. People get used to a name and what it means and its scope and how to communicate in their . . . environment." A new name would support new conceptualizations and practices around a broader scope.
More generally, engineering management practices for integration rely on agreements represented in schedules and documents, and other boundary objects [9] , [58] . A sample of these are included in Table IV . We found that higher level (i.e., "organizational") interdependencies were commonly coordinated through the use of documents. For example, a concept of operations ("CONOPS") document spells out the processes in which a required technology is expected to be used, and a performance requirements document ("PRD") is a written specification of what the technology should be able to do once it is built/delivered. At the lower levels, where many more technical details must be tracked (such as managing changing requirements and risks), interdependencies were usually coordinated with software tools such as spreadsheets or databases; the dynamic object-oriented requirements system (DOORS) was one such tool.
To yield effective integration, changes in boundaries, names, and documentary objects must be linked with complementary adjustments in stakeholder practices. Our data indicate that the most common approach to harmonizing stakeholder practices involved instituting a recurring series of meetings attended by a consistent set of representatives from groups affected by the relevant technological interdependencies. These meetings occurred at multiple levels throughout the enterprise; depending upon the program and level of representative members, they were termed "boards," "integrated project teams" (IPTs), "working groups," etc., as indicated in the Integration Capabilities column of Table IV . Representatives normally included some subset of the stakeholder and subject-matter expert groups specified in the Prince 2 project management methodology (i.e., line management, project management, resource manager, operational customer, support organization, and transformation organization) [48] .
Within these recurring meetings, agonistic tensions of inclusion/exclusion, ownership/investment, and temporal pacing would emerge and would normally be addressed pragmatically [10] by collective decisions about how to manage interdependencies. Participating representatives would then carry the decisions back to their separate organizational units, which would then modify their practices accordingly. The agreements and decisions represented in boundary objects could thus be likened to "knots in the web of infrastructure technologies and concurrent socio-institutional provisions" [17, p. 36] , tying together the different participants' orientations and technological trajectories; they also constitute an iterative series of enterprise value propositions [44] .
Our data also revealed several enterprise-level capabilities for integrating changes in technologies and practices. In the Delta enterprise, engineers relied upon a "capability package" mechanism. This approach united financial, technical, and organizational dimensions of the enterprise in a single formal process for initiating funding and facilitating budget planning and the design of technical requirements and architecture. It was initiated at the highest level of enterprise management and progressed through consensual agreements to deeper levels of detail. Although a "slow and cumbersome" process, it generally resulted in consensual agreements about how to move forward with engineering decisions.
Another enterprise-level means for integrating a multitude of components and stakeholders was the "spiral development" model used in Beta, which emphasized iterative cycles of integration and operational testing as major linkages between technology development and fielding. This involved provisionally accepting large numbers of new candidate technologies (termed "initiatives"), testing them against a baseline system in orchestrated field "experiments" that involved up to hundreds of participants, and then moving forward with those technologies deemed successful. It was usually carried out incrementally and iteratively [47] as a process extending over multiple years with new technologies diffusing out into field use via managed increments and in accordance with CONOPS developed through the exercises.
Finally, if all other integration efforts failed, a last-resort strategy more in keeping with both military and traditional systems engineering approaches was to consolidate budgetary and managerial control within a single "executive office" responsible for the systems engineering effort. Such efforts to rein in divergent stakeholders were attempted in various forms across all five cases; however, tensions continued to emerge between the formal hierarchies, operational users in the field, and newer innovative improvisations leading to eventual fragmentation [31] .
C. Role of Systems Engineering Professionals and Skills for Influence
In explaining how they developed and utilized modularization and integration capabilities, interviewees offered many observations and insights about aspects of their role that were challenging, surprising, and often different from their training and preparation. We identified two major themes from the interviewsambidextrous roles and influence skills-as illustrated by the quotations in Table V. 1) Systems Engineers Play Ambidextrous Roles: As mentioned earlier, the systems engineers we interviewed were employees of an FFRDC in the U.S. or a comparable international organization; each such organization is responsible for a large umbrella contract with one or more specific government agencies. The systems engineers work on separate, individual programs within that government agency or agencies. Whereas the immediate customer (government agency program office) is responsible for performance of a specific technology program, the umbrella contract emphasizes both the work for the immediate customer and higher level concerns regarding enterprise capabilities, including interoperability. Therefore, the systems engineers are ultimately accountable both to managers within the program office and indirectly-through the management chain within their FFRDC (or equivalent international) organization-to higher-level executives at the project's sponsoring government agency.
As a result, the systems engineers must juggle competing evaluative criteria stemming from their often being physically located within the customer organization (cf. [36] , [56] ), while their career progression is centered within the contractor organization and its collaborative projects. 5 As illustrated in Table V 2) Systems Engineers Cultivate Influence Rather Than Power: Although a few senior systems engineers are formally dual-hatted and occupy positions of legitimate authority within the client organization, 6 most systems engineers assume individual contributor roles (presence on teams, liaison roles, etc.) within the client organization. Their influence therefore depends on their reputation and relationships rather than any formal authority. An interviewee referred to the systems engineering unit of the Epsilon program as an "office of influence. No budget, do not implement. . . no authority, but a lot of influence."
Sources of influence range from the more technical to the more interpersonal. On the more technical side, the systems engineers have generally been perceived by customers as objective, problem-focused, and technically capable, and therefore, trustworthy. As an Epsilon interviewee said, "we do good analysis, we have good reputations so they come to us." Engineers have also generated influence through providing demos and "technical guidance." But, increasingly, technical expertise is insufficient as a source of influence. "When I [first started], we did technical problem solving; now it's cultural problem solving." (Epsilon) "Success of projects is about people. If you don't know [the right] people, you can work for a long time and not succeed." (Delta) As a result, systems engineers find themselves exercising influence and even leadership from a strategic position at the nexus of information and relationships, but without any explicit training or skill base. "I was put here [by my General Manager] for a reason and nobody is giving me a recipe. You have to do this by instinct, figure out a path to get what you want." (Epsilon) "We try to be flexible. . . Listen, offer suggestions. . . Compromise, negotiation, alternatives. . . How do we go from nothing to a system of systems? Compromise is a big part of it." (Beta)
These observations about the "people skills" needed in senior systems engineering roles should not be entirely surprising. Decades ago, Hall [30] identified five traits of the ideal systems engineer, two of which were "facility in human relations" and "a gift for expression" (the others were technical). More recently, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration identified five themes among characteristics and behaviors frequently observed in highly regarded systems engineers [64] : leadership, attitudes and attributes, communication, problem solving and systems thinking, and technical acumen. Under leadership for example, there are ten competencies such as "Possesses influencing skills"; and under each competency there are descriptions of observable behaviors, including "Understands the political forces that affect the project," "Influences actions of personnel not under their direct management," and "Builds a base of contacts, information sources, knowledge, and expertise." Overlapping behaviors and competencies reappear in other themes, such as "Gains respect, credibility, and trust" (in attitudes and attributes) and "Facilitates an environment of open and honest communication" (in communication).
Thus, the engineers have been developing a constellation of capabilities and skills to meet the challenges associated with the endless stream of changes in their development environment.
V. DISCUSSION
The intent of our research project was to capture the emerging knowledge among systems engineers about their enterpriselevel challenges. Our results contribute in several areas: 1) the management of infrastructure technology projects; 2) the organizational design and engineering of government enterprises; and 3) the changing role of systems engineering.
A. Management of Infrastructure Technology Projects
Although organizational conflicts around the development of information systems have been well noted in the literatures for information systems (e.g., [39] , [40] , [45] ), systems engineering (e.g., [23] , [33] ), and management (e.g., [22] , [46] ), we found special value in work on cyber infrastructure by Edwards et al. [17] . Their explanation of the consolidation of traditional systems into infrastructures and the attendant agonistic tensions shed light on the challenges of enterprise-scale systems engineering that the engineers were describing in interviews. More recently, Edwards et al. [18] continue to develop an agenda for understanding and addressing the agonistic tensions in infrastructure development.
Our findings about engineering capabilities and skills extend Edwards and associates' ideas and their case studies toward even larger and more complex infrastructure efforts. Looking at the evolving infrastructures of these large government enterprises, we find that capabilities of modularization and integration, coupled with skills for influence, are critical for engineering within these agonistic environments. These findings add specificity to the general notions of loosely managed cooperation among developers and use of an evolutionary approach in IT development [14] . And in contrast to previous research concentrating on specific types of modularity (e.g., [55] ), our work highlights a broad range of modularization practices, such as using prototypes and shorter contracts, as capabilities that systems engineers are developing for achieving modularization. Similarly with regard to integration, our finding that engineers are developing new skills and capabilities for managing interdependencies across organizational units and practices adds to and complements existing work on management techniques for achieving technological interoperability. Additionally, our identification of pacing tensions adds another dimension to Edwards et al.'s [17] categorization of agonistic tensions in infrastructure.
B. Organizational Design and Engineering of Government Enterprises
Our findings support Barley and Kunda's [7] argument that empirical studies of work practices are critical for understanding contemporary organizing processes and developing sound organizational theory. In particular, although a large body of literature recognizes complementarities between organizational design and the design of information systems and technologies (e.g., [3] , [5] , [24] , [40] ), our results advise caution in assuming that these ideas are directly transferable to government enterprises and infrastructures. Organizational design may often be managed through strategic (top-down) design and supported with enterprise resource planning systems. On the other hand, government efforts to mandate enterprise consolidation are at much greater risk of degenerating into destructive fields of agonistic conflict if they suffer from leadership turnover and lack of agreement over assessment criteria [15] , especially when effective governance arrangements are not in place.
Furthermore, our research directs attention to the pacing tensions that arise during infrastructure consolidation-a form of conflict alarming to observe in an institutional field of public government enterprises. We found that as each stakeholder organization struggled to entrain to multiple pacers within its enterprise environment, major oppositional tensions emerged between reliance on structure embedded in traditional hierarchical cultures, and celebration of creative destruction in innovation cultures. This enterprise-scale result was sometimes more like a war over which organization would submit to the other's pace rather than a benign "dance of entrainment" [2] or inevitably "linked elements of a larger formulation" [51] . The failures of Beta and Gamma-where government mandates attempted to force competing organizations into consolidated enterprises using emerging technologies as the "tip of the spear" 7 -were extremely costly temporally and financially; they also significantly undermined organizational reputations and employee morale. We suspect that such tensions may be stretching the limits of systems engineering capabilities to the breaking point, especially in light of the path dependence that "locks in" effects of choices and that can lead to dominance of inferior technologies over potentially superior solutions [17, p. 17] , [62] ). Therefore, initiators and higher level managers of government infrastructure efforts must become attuned to potential mismatches in temporal cycles across the intended enterprise.
A more optimistic finding is that systems engineers' newly developing capabilities can facilitate the continual process of organizing and reorganizing organizational units and practices within these turbulent environments of agonistic tensions and technological innovation. These engineering capabilities provide an engineering-oriented complement to the growing body of organizationally oriented theories of task articulation and rearrangement of work practices, routines and processes for accommodating new technologies (e.g., [6] , [25] - [27] , [60] ); together they point to new ways to resolve local-global tensions in infrastructure development [59] .
C. Changing Role of Systems Engineers
Systems engineers have traditionally had a professional responsibility and a unique role in terms of "systems thinking," i.e., being big picture "visionary" designers [17] , who manage technical constraints within relatively stable environments. But in unstable multistakeholder infrastructure projects they must find a delicate balance between what will work technically and what will work politically, along with what will satisfy the basic intent of the engineering task.
Because systems engineers are not often tied to one specific funder, but are assumed to be available to whichever funders come out on top, they have some clout in helping (or hindering) competition between funders. Systems engineers thus find themselves in a key leverage position for determining each next step in emergent organizing processes: they are technically savvy and familiar with many stakeholders, while their training predisposes them to avoid taking political sides. Combining technical knowledge and familiarity with the role of honest broker across multiple stakeholders thus renders systems engineers in a position to be a "back channel" for integrating across stakeholders in ways somewhat analogous to labor negotiators and international diplomats.
The necessary skills for exercising influence and getting things done through other people, particularly in a multistakeholder environment, have rarely been taught but are now entering the systems engineering curriculum. These skills include listening, delivering persuasive arguments, role taking, relationship building through competence and integrity, and negotiating (including compromising and finding win-win solutions) [4] , [13] , [49] , [61] , [64] . Commenting on the need to combine academic education with real-world experience, Ring and Madni [52, p. 975] suggest that "no academic institution can provide a sufficient learning environment for developing SE practitioners."
Meanwhile, systems engineers working on government infrastructure projects are already developing a somewhat different skill set than the linear technical analysis of traditional systems engineering. Prototypical behaviors that were invented by senior systems engineers in our cases included the recurring meetings of representatives from affected organizations and the "back channel" networking among FFRDC engineers spanning organizational boundaries among stakeholders. These afford manifold practical implications for a more "holistic engineering education" [29] , as well as for review and evaluation of their accomplishments. Beyond these individual competencies of systems engineers, our findings suggest implications for the overall management of systems engineering programs, including developing thoughtful strategy about how systems engineering organizations can use their connections to build trustful networks ahead of the need for specific technological changes.
D. Limitations and Future Research
Our research is based on five case studies within a highly constrained set of government sectors, and most of the projects are still ongoing. Further, each case study is based on a small number of interviews, in most cases with only MITRE personnel rather than a broad sampling of stakeholders. However, our results are consistent with a growing literature on the limitations of traditional systems engineering and the need for advanced systems engineering capabilities. Research is needed to accumulate a broader set of examples of large, multistakeholder government infrastructure projects, including longitudinal studies of practices and their degree of success. We would especially like to see more research on spiral development (cf., [8] ), which seems to offer promise for managing infrastructure development tensions. Research contrasting nongovernment cases would also be interesting.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have leveraged practitioner perspectives to first identify challenges facing systems engineers working on government infrastructure technology projects, and then to identify the capabilities and skills these engineers are developing in response to those challenges. We found that agonistic tensions surface during the infrastructure consolidation phase, especially when stakeholder relations are not already well established and, at least in our government cases, particularly with regard to the pacing of enterprise change and infrastructure development. There is some preliminary evidence that the success of these projects is related to the way agonistic tensions are managed. In their adaptive response to the difficult experience of these tensions, systems engineers are developing capabilities of modularization and integration to facilitate more rapid and flexible organizing and new relational skills, especially with regard to influence and functioning as a trusted and well-connected neutral third party. Whether these adaptations will be adequate to meet the challenges remains unclear at this time.
We see several possible paths forward, all of which support the observation that "reliable systems for surfacing and dealing with [infrastructure] tensions need to be put in place" [34] . First, while systems engineers are not at the executive level, there may be advantages to raising their positional authority, at least of a chief engineer or project manager, and highlighting the importance of the role of "honest broker" to moderate agonistic tensions. Second, these challenges are not the sole responsibility of systems engineers; there should be changes in complementary roles, e.g., managers of systems engineers, project managers, and stakeholder leaders. Finally, infrastructure development and sustainability, especially in contexts of rapid leadership turnover and lack of consensual evaluative criteria, requires special attention to the tensions between innovation and integration. Hobday et al. [32] note that systems integration is an organizing crux for networks of large-scale economic organization. Like canaries in a coal mine, the experience of enterprise systems engineers may be forewarning of an uninhabitable environment. What would be our best intelligent response? APPENDIX TIER 1 INTERVIEW PROTOCOL Thank you for agreeing to participate in this interview. It is part of a joint MITRE-MIT research study that leverages social science to help define the discipline and advance the practice of "enterprise systems engineering. 
